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INTRODUCTION 
A small business owner looking to open another convenience store 
in an urban area found a site that appeared perfect. She enlisted her 
attorney to prepare the paperwork to complete the deal, only to be 
advised that there might be a problem. The attorney informed her that 
a federal statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act1 ("CERCLA"), makes property 
owners liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste on their 
property. The attorney explained that in the 1950s and 1960s, there 
had been a lawn and garden store in the building on the property. 
Given the lax regulation of the storage and disposal of herbicides 
during this period, the site could be contaminated with hazardous 
waste and expensive remediation of the soil might be required in the 
future.2 A quick check revealed that the property was not a current 
target of federal enforcement, but if that changed, the current owner 
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
2. See K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1146 (W.D. Mo. 1998) 
(involving a site formerly used to store and blend chemicals used to manufacture herbicides). 
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of the site would be liable for the cleanup costs under CERCLA. The 
attorney said the only way to accurately assess whether the site is 
contaminated is to conduct an environmental assessment, but 
conducting the assessment could actually create liability if soil testing 
disturbs the contamination.3 The business owner decided to purchase a 
previously undeveloped lot instead. 
The preceding hypothetical illustrates some of the problems 
associated with developing brownfields - previously developed land 
that is or might be contaminated by hazardous waste.4 Fear of 
CERCLA liability5 often causes developers to seek property, known 
as greenfields, that have never been used for industrial purposes 
before, leaving many brownfields idle and unremediated.6 The result 
of greenfield development is sprawl and urban decay.7 For those 
willing to consider redeveloping brownfields, environmental 
assessments are a popular way to avoid, or at least assess, CERCLA 
liability.8 Unfortunately, soil testing can also spread contamination.9 
This Note addresses an unnecessary legal complication to the already 
3. See K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-54. 
4. CERCLA defines a brownfield site as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, 
or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A). 
5. CERCLA liability can easily reach millions of dollars. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 57 (1998) (noting that the EPA's response plan at the site "called for 
expenditures well into the tens of millions of dollars"). 
6. ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 7 (2000) (quoting Johnine J. Brown, 
Environmental Justice Conflict Could End with Justice if Brownfields Are Reclaimed, ILL. 
LEGAL TIMES, June 1995, at 13). There are an estimated 500,000 brownfield sites 
nationwide. Id. at 5. 
7. GELTMAN, supra note 6, at 7. For more information on factors contributing to the 
brownfields problem and some proposed solutions, see Michael Allen Wolf, Dangerous 
Crossing: State Brownfields Recycling and Federal Enterprise Zoning, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L.J. 495 (1998), .:nd John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental 
Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243 (1997-
1998). 
8. See Keith M. Casto & Tiffany Billingsley Potter, Environmental Audits: Barriers, 
Opportunities and a Recommendation, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 233, 234 
n.5 (1999); Lorraine Lewandrowski, Toxic Blackacre: Appraisal Techniques & Current 
Trends In Valuation, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 55, 57 (1994). Although the EPA has 
identified many hazardous waste sites, any party looking to purchase an industrial site is 
likely to conduct an environmental assessment of the property, which may include soil 
testing that could disturb hazardous waste on the property. See MAXINE I. LIPELES, 
HAZARDOUS WASTE 402-04 (3d ed 1997); Casto, supra, at 234 n.5. 
9. For example, wells dug to monitor the spread of contamination may actually increase 
the migration rates of some pollutants. See Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 
917, 921 (5th Cir. 2000); K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1147 
(W.D.Mo. 1998). Similarly, boring into the ground to extract columns of soil for analysis can 
cause the surrounding soil to cave in, resulting in a mixing or shifting of contamination. See 
United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 719-20 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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complex task of brownfield redevelopment: the fact that the widely 
used environmental assessment can create CERCLA liability for soil 
testing companies and those who hire them if soil testing spreads 
hazardous waste. Following a brief overview of the CERCLA scheme, 
this Introduction discusses the federal courts' disagreement over 
whether soil testing creates CERCLA liability. The remainder of the 
Note explains why soil testers and those who hire them are liable 
under CERCLA and advocates a legislatively created exemption from 
CERCLA liability. 
A. CERCLA Overview 
CERCLA was created after it became clear that the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")10 was inadequate to 
address sites already contaminated with hazardous waste.11 CERCLA 
gives the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") the power to 
respond to an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance by 
cleaning up the waste itself, then suing the statutorily-defined 
potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") for reimbursement of the 
response costs.12 It also permits parties that incur response costs to 
seek reimbursement or contribution from PRPs.13 CERCLA imposes 
strict liability,14 jointly and severally, on responsible parties, although 
10. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). 
11. LIPELES, supra note 8, at 276. RCRA mainly regulates the disposal of hazardous 
waste in the future. CERCLA was Congress's response to prominent cases of contamination 
such as Love Canal. Love Canal garnered national attention when chemicals at the site 
leaked into the basements of homes and New York State struggled to respond appropriately. 
Id. at 275-76. 
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (2000). CERCLA created a federal fund known as the 
Superfund to finance cleanups conducted by the EPA. Id. § 9604(a). Any money collected 
from responsible parties in reimbursement actions goes back into the Superfund. Id. § 
9607(c)(3). Because of this fund, CERCLA is sometimes known just as Superfund. LIPELES, 
supra note 8, at 275. The EPA may also force private parties to conduct a cleanup under 
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Response costs include the cost to remove, contain, or 
otherwise neutralize contaminants. See id. § 9601(25). The hazardous substances covered by 
CERCLA can be found at id. § 9601(14). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (allowing parties that incur response costs but are not 
"responsible" under CERCLA to recover their costs from PRPs); id. § 9613(f) (allowing 
PRPs to seek contribution from other PRPs). See also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., 
Inc., 160 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004). 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (stating that responsible parties, "subject only to the defenses set 
forth in [the statute] . . .  shall be liable for" response costs). Congress indicated that it 
intended the statute to impose strict liability in the legislative history of the main 
predecessor bill to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 
which amended the original CERCLA. H.R. REP. No. 99-253 pt. 1, at 74 (1986). In addition, 
courts have consistently interpreted CERCLA as imposing strict liability, both before and 
after the 1986 SARA amendments. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & 
Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, 
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
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courts can apportion liability in appropriate circumstances. 15 
CERCLA liability depends on proving four basic elements: 1) 
hazardous substances were disposed of at a facility; 2) there has been a 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the 
facility into the environment; 3) the release or threatened release 
requires the expenditure of response costs; and 4) the defendant is a 
PRP.16 The PRPs are: 1) the facility's current owner or operator; 2) the 
facility's owner or operator at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance; 3) any person who arranged for the disposal, treatment, or 
transportation by another entity of hazardous substances ("arranger"); 
and 4) any person who transported hazardous substances to facilities 
selected by another person ("transporter").17 Liability can be avoided 
completely only if the PRP proves one of CERCLA's narrowly­
defined defenses: that the release was caused by an act of God, an act 
of war, or the act or omission of a third party. 18  
Two of the statute's limitations on liability create special incentives 
to conduct environmental assessments. The innocent landowner 
defense, part of the third party defense, allows current owners to 
escape liability completely if they can show that they "did not know 
and had no reason to know" the site was contaminated with hazardous 
waste when they purchased the property. 19  In order to meet this 
standard, the owner must conduct "all appropriate inquiries . . . into 
the previous ownership and uses of the facility."20 CERCLA now 
15. CERCLA liability is normally joint and several because it is often difficult to 
apportion liability when hazardous wastes from many sources are commingled at a site. 
Congress intended CERCLA apportionment to be governed by common law tort principles 
and guided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443. E.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 
Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258-59 
(3d Cir. 1992). For the purpose of this Note, it will be assumed that the first three elements 
of CERCLA liability can be proved; this Note focuses solely on whether testing companies 
or prospective purchasers can be PRPs. 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
18. Id. § 9607(b). 
19. Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (2002) (emphasis added). 
20. Id. § 9601(35)(B). The few published decisions fail to come to a consensus on what 
constituted an appropriate inquiry prior to the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Brownfields Revitalization Act]. 
See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 707 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that no 
inquiry at all might be appropriate when the purchaser is only acquiring a fractional interest 
in the property to consolidate ownership after an inheritance); XDP, Inc. v. Watumull Props. 
Corp., No. 99-1703-AS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12057, at *28 (D. Or. May 14, 2004) (holding 
that a factfinder could conclude that the owner did not conduct all appropriate inquiries 
when it "did not hire an environmental consultant, did not review the current [state 
environmental agency] file, and did not investigate prior owners of" the property); Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 105, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(holding that a defendant that introduced no evidence of any inquiry did not establish the 
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contains a new partial limitation on liability; the liability of "bona fide 
prospective purchasers" is limited to a lien on the property for 
unrecovered government costs up to the increase in the property's 
value from the cleanup.21 Although bona fide prospective purchasers 
can know that the property is contaminated when they buy it, they 
must still conduct "all appropriate inquiries" into the previous 
ownership and uses of property.22 Thus, CERCLA encourages 
inspection and testing of sites. 
B. The Soil Testing Controversy 
Courts that have ruled on the issue of CERCLA liability for soil 
testing are divided on two questions: whether soil testers or those who 
hire them are PRPs and, if theyoare PRPs, whether any exemption 
from liability applies. When determining whether soil testers and 
prospective purchasers are PRPs, courts are split on two subquestions: 
whether soil testing is a disposal and whether the parties are 
operators, arrangers, or transporters.23 
innocent landowner defense); Advanced Tech. Corp. v. Eliskim, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 
(N.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that assurances that purchaser was only receiving 
uncontaminated portion of contaminated parcel may have obviated the need for further 
inquiry); United States v. Serafini, 791 F. Supp. 107, 108 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the 
inquiry was not appropriate because defendant had not viewed the property before 
purchase). The Brownfields Revitalization Act commands the EPA to establish standards 
for conducting "all appropriate inquiries." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(ii) (2002). The EPA 
recently issued a proposed rule. Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 69 
Fed. Reg. 52,542 (proposed Aug. 26, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 312). Until the 
EPA issues a final rule, the defense will be analyzed under the same five factors as in 
previous versions of the statute if the property was purchased before May 31, 1997. Compare 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(iv)(I) (2002) with id. § 9601(35)(8) (2000). For property purchased 
on or after May 31, 1997, the procedures of the American Society for Testing and Materials 
("ASTM"), designed to help purchasers comply with the pre-2002 CERCLA, will be 
sufficient. Id. § 9601(35)(B)(iv)(II) (2002) (referring to ASTM, Standard Practice for 
Environmental Site Assessment: Phase I E_nvironmental Site Assessment Process, E1527-97). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r) (2002). The limitation applies to those who buy property after 
January 11, 2002 and meet other statutory conditions. Id. § 9601(40). 
22. Id. § 9601(4U)(B). The standards for inquiry under the innocent landowner defense 
also satisfy the inquiry portion of the bona fide prospective purchaser limitation. Id. 
23. All of the categories of responsible parties are defined by their relationship to the 
disposal of the hazardous waste except the facility's current owner or operator. See id. § 
9607(a) (2000). Although the difference in the statutory language of§ 9607(a)(l) (current 
owner or operator) and § 9607(a)(2) (owner or operator at the time of disposal) indicates 
that prior owners and operators can defend against liability if they were not the owner or 
operator "at the time of disposal," ambiguities in the definition of "disposal" have divided 
the circuits on whether passively allowing waste to enter the environment can create liability 
under§ 9607(a)(2). Compare Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 
(4th Cir. 1992) (concluding that passive migration can constitute disposal), with Carson 
Harbor Viii., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that passive 
migration cannot constitute disposal), United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (same), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(same), and United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996) (same). The 
controversy does not affect the analysis of this Note. In looking at liability for soil testing, 
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Some courts have concluded that soil testing can make testers and 
those who hire them PRPs. For example, the Third Circuit, in United 
States v. CDMG Realty Co.,24 held that the testing the defendant had 
ordered would ordinarily constitute a disposal because the text of 
CERCLA states that disposal includes discharging or placing 
hazardous wastes "into or on any land or water," even if hazardous 
material was already present.25 The court also held that there was no 
threshold level of contamination that needed to be reached before 
liability would attach.26 The court did not decide whether the testing 
company was an owner, operator, transporter or arranger, but 
asserted it was a PRP and left the precise basis for liability to the 
district court.27 Likewise, the Western District of Missouri, in K.C.1986 
Limited Partnership v. Reade Manufacturing,28 found that a reasonable 
trier of fact could conclude that the testing company was a CERCLA 
operator,29 and that a disposal of hazardous wastes occurred during 
testing, thus establishing CERCLA liability.30 
On the other hand, Blas/and, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North 
Miami concluded that a testing company was not a PRP.31 The 
Blas/and court determined, with little explication of its reasoning, that 
an environmental testing company that conducted aquifer studies was 
not an operator because "engaging in clean-up activities at a facility 
this Note assumes some active participation in spreading contamination at a site. For more 
information on the passive disposal controversy, and whether soil testers and prospective 
purchasers may also be liable on the theory that they passively allowed waste to migrate 
during the time of testing, see Robert L. Bronston, Note, The Case Against Intermediate 
Owner Liability Under CERCLA for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 609 (1994), and Patrick D. Traylor, Comment, Liability of Past Owners: Does 
CERCLA Incorporate a Causation-Based Standard?, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 535 (1994). 
24. 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996). The owner of the property, HMAT Associates, sued the 
former owner, Dowel Associates, asserting as one theory of liability that Dowel disposed of 
hazardous waste on the property because the company ordered testing of the site's 
contaminated soil. Id. at 710. 
25. Id. at 719 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988)). 
26. Id. The court ultimately concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because a reasonable factfinder could find that a dispersal of contaminants occurred: the 
holes for testing, which went through layers of many types of wastes, collapsed on 
themselves. Id. at 720. 
27. Id. at 718 n.11. The district court had not reached the issue because it had concluded 
that the volume of contamination spread during testing was insufficient to constitute a 
disposal. Id. at 719. 
28. 33 F. Supp. 2d. 1143 (W.D. Mo. 1998). 
29. Id. at 1153-54. 
30. Id. at 1149-50. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that a testing company could be an 
operator or arranger, depending on the degree of control the company exercised over 
hazardous waste at the site. Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 928-29 
(5th Cir. 2000). The court did not address whether the testing constituted a disposal. See id. 
31. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
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does not qualify as the type of 'operation' CERCLA contemplates."32 
Blasland also concluded that the testing did not result in a disposal 
because it did not move wastes to an uncontaminated part of the 
property.33 
Courts are also split on whether the statute should be read to 
exempt soil testing from liability. In CDMG Realty, the Third Circuit 
created such an exemption when it held that soil testing must be 
conducted negligently to constitute a disposal under CERCLA.34 The 
court reasoned that because prospective purchasers cannot establish 
the innocent landowner defense unless they conduct an appropriate 
inquiry into possible contamination,35 Congress must have intended 
soil testing to be exempt from CERCLA liability.36 The court 
concluded, however, that liability still could be imposed if the testing 
was conducted negligently, because such testing would not be an 
appropriate investigation under CERCLA.37 
The Western District of Missouri explicitly rejected the Third 
Circuit's negligence liability standard and refused to create any 
exemption to CERCLA liability for pre-acquisition soil testing.38 The 
court relied on the lack of an express exception in the statute.39 It 
reasoned further that the innocent landowner defense would still have 
continued applicability because soil tests would not be "appropriate" 
32. Id. at 1377, 1379-80. The aquifer study included excavating a series of pits in 
contaminated soil on the property. Id. at 1380. 
33. Id. at 1380. The court may have left open the possibility of liability if testing 
contaminates clean soil in future cases. See id. 
34. 96 F.3d 706, 721 (3d Cir. 1996). 
35. Id. at 721 (citing CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (2000)). 
36. Id. It is interesting to note that the court was not addressing environmental 
assessment soil testing. Id. at 722. The former owner, Dowel, had tested the site, an old 
landfill, to see if it could support construction. Id. at 711. This background fact calls into 
question the court's reliance on the incentive to test property created by the innocent 
landowner defense because Dowel was not trying to determine if the landfill contained 
hazardous waste. Id. at 722. Indeed, Dowel could not have established the innocent 
landowner defense; it should have known that hazardous wastes were buried in the landfill it 
was purchasing because the EPA and state environmental protection agency had started 
investigating the site several years before Dowel purchased it. Id. at 711; see also 42 U.S.C. § 
9601 (35)(A)(i). This flaw in the court's reasoning does not affect the reasoning of this Note, 
however, because the Note assumes the testing was performed to detect contamination. 
37. CDMG Realty , 96 F.3d at 722. The court said that implying a negligence standard 
was the best way to "harmonize[ ]CERCLA's clear intention to allow soil investigations and 
its goal of remedying hazardous waste sites." Id. at 722. It supported its reasoning by 
pointing to two provisions of CERCLA that expressly use a negligence standard, 
the third party defense, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(a), and actions consistent with the 
National Contingency Plan, Id. § 9607(d)(l). CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 721-22. 
38. K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1148, 1153 (W.D. Mo. 
1998). 
39. Id. at 1151. 
June 2005] No Good Deed 1937 
or required in every case and would not create liability unless testing 
actually spread contamination.40 
This Note argues that CERCLA, as it is currently written, requires 
courts to hold parties liable for pre-purchase soil investigations that 
spread or mix contamination because to conclude otherwise would 
stretch CERCLA beyond its breaking point. Part I argues that both 
those who order pre-acquisition soil testing and those who conduct the 
tests are PRPs if the testing spreads existing contamination. Part II 
argues that the statute does not allow for the judicial creation of a soil 
testing liability exception. Part III acknowledges the policy problems 
created by testing liability and advocates a legislative solution to 
exempt pre-purchase soil testing from CERCLA liability. 
I. CERCLA LIABILITY FOR PRE-ACQUISITION SOIL TESTING 
This Part argues that pre-acquisition soil investigation, when it 
disturbs existing contamination, makes the prospective purchaser and 
the testing company a PRP under CERCLA. Specifically, section I.A 
argues that pre-acquisition soil testing that spreads contamination 
constitutes disposal. Section LB argues that testers and those who hire 
them are operators. Because soil testers and those who hire them are 
operators at the time of disposal, they are PRPs and exposed to 
CERCLA liability.41 
A. Pre-acquisition Soil Testing as Disposal 
When asking whether pre-acquisition soil testing can itself create 
liability, one must first determine whether the testing constitutes a 
disposal because soil testers generally do not own or operate the 
property at the time of litigation.42 CERCLA defines disposal as: 
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of 
any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that 
such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter 
the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, 
including ground waters.43 
The plain meaning of disposal in the statute encompasses the effects of 
soil testing. For instance, the drilling or excavating that normally 
accompanies testing might entail forcing contamination from the 
40. Id. at 1152. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). 
42. See supra note 23 (explaining that all PRPs except current owners and operators are 
defined by their relationship to the disposal of waste). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (incorporating by reference the definition of disposal from the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act at id. § 6903(3) (2000)). 
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upper levels of soil to lower levels of soil or groundwater.44 
Contamination from one testing area may be spread to other areas by 
equipment that is not cleaned between uses.45 Such activity would 
constitute a deposit or placing under a plain understanding of the 
terms.46 Similarly, testing may cause a spilling or leaking if a hole made 
for testing collapses, causing the mixing or shifting of contaminants47 
or if the rate of the spread of hazardous wastes is increased by deep 
holes in the soil.48 Any of these activities would likely put hazardous 
waste in a position to "enter the environment."49 Finally, Congress's 
choice to define disposal with words that have a wide variety of 
ordinary meanings such as injection and spilling50 suggests that it was 
trying to reach many kinds of situations where contamination spreads. 
Thus, a broad reading of the individual terms is appropriate.51 Where 
the meaning of a term in a statute is plain, there is no need to resort to 
other canons of statutory construction.52 
CERCLA applies to hazardous waste placed on "any land." not 
just previously uncontaminated land.53 There are no words of 
limitation to indicate a congressional intent to restrict disposal to the 
initial introduction of hazardous waste to a site.54 This lack of 
restriction is relevant because when pre-acquisition soil testing spreads 
contamination, it generally spreads hazardous waste to other areas of 
the same facility that may already be contaminated.55 Contrary to the 
suggestion in Blas/and that testing must spread hazardous wastes to 
"clean soil,"56 Congress's intent to provide for the cleanup of 
44. See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 720 (3d Cir. 1996). 
45. S eeid. 
46. Accord id. 
47. See id. 
48. See K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1149-50 (W.D. Mo. 
1998). 
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000). 
50. Id. 
51. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that the words in the definition of disposal have a wide variety of meanings and 
should not be limited to active disposal only). 
52. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1993); Caminetti v. United States, 242 
U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (incorporated by reference into the definition of disposal in 
CERCLA at id. § 9601(29) (2000)); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. 
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1992). 
54. 42 u.s.c. § 6903(3). 
55. See, e.g., K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1147 (W.D. Mo. 
1998) (describing an alleged increase in the contamination rate of a regional aquifer due to 
monitoring wells as a possible disposal). 
56. Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380 (S.D. 
Fla. 2000). 
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hazardous waste dumps used by multiple companies57 requires that 
liability attach to persons who make the contamination worse, 
including those who spread additional contamination deep into the 
soil.58 Thus, when soil testing activities spread contamination, the 
fairest reading of CERCLA is to conclude that the activity constitutes 
a disposal. 
Likewise, CERCLA's definition of disposal does not exempt small 
disposals of hazardous waste. CERCLA defines disposal as "the 
discharge ... or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or 
on any land or water," thus implying that there is no minimum amount 
of disposal required to trigger liability as long as response costs are 
also incurred.59 In addition, hazardous waste is defined without 
reference to any minimum quantity needed for the substance to be 
considered hazardous; it is the character, not the quantity, of the 
substance that makes waste hazardous under CERCLA.60 
The few places in the statute that Congress did indicate that the 
amount of hazardous waste involved should lead to specific outcomes 
supports the interpretation that CERCLA was intended to apply to 
the disposal of even small amounts of hazardous wastes. The most 
notable statutory reference to amounts of hazardous waste is the new 
de micromis exemption, which excludes some arrangers and 
transporters of small amounts of hazardous waste from liability under 
the statute.61 The fact that the de micrornis exemption only applies to a 
limited set of arrangers and transporters - and does not apply to any 
owners or operators - indicates that the 107th Congress believed that 
the disposal of small amounts of hazardous waste created liability 
under CERCLA for owners and operators.62 
In addition, when Congress decided to require facilities to report 
the release of hazardous substances to the government,63 it was careful 
57. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (describing CERCLA's strict, joint and 
several liability scheme). 
58. See K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added) (incorporated by reference as the CERCLA 
definition of disposal by id.§ 9601(29) (2000)), construed in Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 
191 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706 at 719; 
K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. Contra United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 875 
F. Supp. 1077, 1085 (D. N.J. 1995); Monica Shah Desai, Disposing of United States v. 
CDMG Realty Co.: The Case Against the Application of CERCLA Liability for De Minimis 
Disturbances of Pre-existing Contamination, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 200 (1997). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (defining a "hazardous substance" as any substance listed in, 
listed pursuant to, or with characteristics described in various federal environmental laws), 
construed in Acushnet Co., 191 F.3d at 76. 
61. 42 u.s.c. § 9607(0) (2002). 
62. See id. 
63. Id. § 9603(a) (2000). 
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to give the EPA authority to set threshold quantities below which 
releases of hazardous substances need not be reported.64 The 
exemption of small releases from CERCLA's reporting requirements 
indicates that Congress was aware that sometimes only small amounts 
of hazardous wastes would be released.65 Despite this awareness, 
Congress did not give the EPA similar power to exempt 
PRPs that disposed of small amounts of waste from CERCLA's 
liability scheme,66 again indicating that small disposals can create 
CERCLA liability. 
Furthermore, the settlement provisions of the statute67 treat de 
minimis contributors of hazardous waste as good candidates for 
settlement, not as exempt from liability.68 In addition to giving the 
EPA the power to settle with any PRP,69 CERCLA directs the EPA to 
settle quickly with de minimis contributors under its expedited 
settlement provision.70 This provision covers exactly the situation of 
pre-acquisition soil testers; the EPA is to settle with PRPs when 
"[b]oth of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous 
substances at the facility: (i) The amount of the hazardous substances 
contributed by that party to the facility [and] (ii) The toxic or other 
hazardous effects of the substances contributed by that party to the 
facility."71 Although the expedited settlement provision does not apply 
to suits initiated by private parties rather than the EPA,72 the 
provision shows that Congress intended small contributors to be 
responsible parties under the statute.73 
64. Id. § 9602(a); see also id. § 9603(a) (referring to the threshold quantities set pursuant 
to§ 9602). 
65. See id. § 9602(a). 
66. See Kelley v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding 
that the EPA has no authority to define who is and is not liable in private suits to recover 
response costs). 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9622. The settlement provisions are intended to encourage the EPA to 
settle out of court with potentially responsible parties instead of engaging in costly legal 
battles if a favorable settlement can be reached. Id. § 9622(a). 
68. Id. § 9622(g). 
69. Id. § 9622(a). 
70. Id. § 9622(g). 
71. Id. § 9622(g)(l)(A). Also, the settlement must "involve[] only a minor portion of the 
response costs at the facility." Id. 
72. Id. § 9622. If a party enters into a de minimis settlement agreement with the EPA, it 
is not liable to other PRPs for contribution "regarding matters addressed in the settlement." 
Id. § 9622(g)(5). 
73. Similarly, the EPA's guidance on settlements supports the conclusion that de 
minimis contributors are not exempt from liability under CERCLA. Small contributors to 
contamination are treated as good settlement candidates, and no mention is made of some 
minimal amount of contribution necessary before those parties could be liable. Superfund 
Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. 
Reg, 34,235 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Aug. 18, 1989); Announcement and Publication of 
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Because soil testing can result in a disposal, if soil testers and those 
who hire them are operators under the statute, they are PRPs.74 
Congress's definition of an "operator" as "any person . . .  operating [a] 
facility"75 has been repeatedly recognized as unhelpful for deciding 
who falls into this PRP category.76 Nonetheless, Congress's use of the 
word operator in other sections of the statute indicates that it was 
interested in ensuring that only those with the ability to control a 
facility are liable for response costs. For instance, CERCLA states 
that an operator "does not include a person, who, without participating 
in the management of a . . .  facility, holds indicia of ownership,"77 thus 
implying that such a person who did participate in the management of 
a facility would be considered an operator. Similarly, the term does 
not apply to common carriers after they deliver hazardous wastes to a 
disposal or treatment facility,78 again suggesting that Congress's main 
concern was with those who could control hazardous wastes. 
Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property and 
Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (Envtl. Prot. Agency July 3, 
1995); Superfund Program; Revised Model De Minimis Contributor Consent Decree and 
Administrative Order on Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,849 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Dec. 7, 1995). 
Although the EPA's guidance statements are not entitled to deference under Chevron, Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), because they do not have the 
force of law, the statements are still entitled to some deference based on their thoroughness, 
validity of reasoning, consistency, and power to persuade. See Christensen v. Harris County, 
529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that an opinion letter from the Department of Labor was not 
eligible for Chevron deference but was eligible for deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
74. PRPs include "person[s) who at the time of disposal . . .  operated [a) facility." 42 
U.S.C. § 9607. Some courts have hinted that soil testers might also be arrangers or 
transporters. Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 929 (5th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 718 n.11 (3d Cir. 1996); Blasland, Bouck & 
Lee, Inc. v. City of N. Miami, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2000). Focusing on 
operator liability is prudent because the de micromis exemption in the Small Business 
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 exempts some arrangers and 
transporters of small amounts of hazardous waste from liability. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0) (2002). 
The exemption applies to arrangers or transporters of less than 110 gallons of liquid material 
or 200 pounds of solid material if the disposal occurred before April 1, 2001. Id. No court has 
yet addressed whether a party that is an arranger or transporter and an operator may take 
advantage of the de micromis exemption, so it is theoretically possible that some testers may 
escape CERCLA liability under this provision. The exemption applies, however, only to 
disposals at the relatively small number of facilities on the National Priorities List ("NPL"), 
which includes only the most contaminated sites. Id. Thus, testing at all non-NPL sites will 
still expose soil testers and those who hire them to CERCLA liability as operators. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (2000). 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998) (stating "[h)ere of course 
we may again rue the uselessness of CERCLA's definition of a facility's 'operator . . . .  "' 
(citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995))). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (emphasis added). 
78. Id. § 9601(20)(C). 
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The conclusion that an operator must have some degree of control 
over a facility is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the term in United States v. Bestfoods.19 Turning to the ordinary 
understanding of the word operator and considering CERCLA's 
concern with hazardous wastes, the Court concluded that an operator 
"must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to 
pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal 
of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental 
regulations."80 Both the company performing soil testing of possibly 
contaminated soil and the person that hires it potentially "manage, 
direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution" in 
determining if and how testing for contamination will be conducted. 
Thus, both testers and those that hire them are operators under 
CERCLA because they exercise control over hazardous waste.81 
One counterargument is that Bestfoods narrowed the definition of 
operator to encompass only the person with actual control over the 
entire facility,82 such as the entity with authority to decide whether or 
not to clean up hazardous wastes. The interpretation is weak, 
however, because Bestfoods indicated that anyone that "manage[s], 
direct[s], or conduct[s] operations specifically related to pollution" is 
an operator83 and gave no indication that each facility could have only 
79. 524 U.S. at 66-67. 
80. Id. at 66-67 (citing definitions of operate from THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1268 (3d ed. 1992) and WEBSTER'S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1707 (2d ed. 1958)). K.C.1986 Limited Partnership v. Reade 
Manufacturing, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1153-54 (W.D. Mo. 1998), engages in a similar reading 
of the statutory language, although it does not make specific reference to Bestfoods, which 
was decided three months earlier. 
81. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67; see United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 
718 n.11 (3d Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the purchaser could be liable as an operator because 
it "controlled the source of the contamination"). Several courts have also held that 
construction contractors were operators because they controlled the movement of hazardous 
wastes at a site. The lead construction cases are Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. 
Carel/us Development Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992), and Tanglewood East 
Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988). 
82. Although the court in Blas/and does not clearly articulate a reason for its decision 
that environmental testers cannot be operators under CERCLA, it likely intended to rely on 
this argument. See Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc., v. City of N. Miami, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 
1379-80 (S.D. Fla. 2000). Blas/and emphasized the Supreme Court's statement that an 
operator is "someone who directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a 
facility," in concluding that an environmental engineering firm was not an operator under 
CERCLA. Id. (citing Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66). Blas/and, however, did not address the 
Court's next sentence in Bestfoods, quoted in part in the text accompanying footnote 80, 
which further clarifies that an operator is not only someone with general control of a site, 
but someone with control of pollution issues or hazardous waste disposal. The Court said it 
was further refining its general definition of an operator "(t]o sharpen the definition for 
purposes of CERCLA's concern with environmental contamination . . . . " Bestfoods, 524 
U.S. at 66. 
83. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66. 
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one operator.84 Thus, because soil testers and those who hire them are 
operators at the time of disposal, they are PRPs.85 
II. A LIABILITY EXCEPTION? 
Having concluded that soil testers and those who hire them are 
properly characterized as PRPs, the next step is to evaluate whether 
any exception to CERCLA liability applies. This Part argues that, 
contrary to the interpretation of CERCLA advanced by the Third 
Circuit in United States v. CDMG Realty Co .,86 CERCLA's text does 
not allow for any judicially created exceptions to liability. 
The question of whether pre-acquisition soil testing is exempt from 
liability should begin and end with the text of CERCLA itself; 
CERCLA expressly forbids courts from applying defenses not 
articulated in the statute's text.87 For this reason, courts generally 
refuse to allow even traditional equitable defenses in CERCLA 
actions.88 Because Congress eliminated all defenses in CERCLA 
actions not articulated in the statute's text, Congress needed to create 
an exemption for pre-acquisition soil testing if it did not intend the 
testing to create liability.89 The text of the Act, however, simply does 
not mention pre-acquisition soil testing or indicate in any way that 
such testing should be treated any differently from other types of 
disposal.90 None of the explicit statutory defenses apply to pre­
acquisition soil testing,91 therefore the testing is not exempt from 
CERCLA liability. 
84. See id at 66-67. 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2000). 
86. 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (stating that PRPs are liable "[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this 
section" (emphasis added)). 
88. See, e.g., Town of Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 27 F.3d 1268, 1270 (7th Cir. 
1994) (refusing to apply !aches); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 530 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (same); General Elec. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that CERCLA does not allow an unclean hands defense to liability); 
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988) (refusing 
to apply caveat emptor as a defense to liability). 
89. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (establishing the general defenses to CERCLA 
liability: act of God, act of war, and third party defenses); id. § 9619 (exempting contractors 
working for the government or private parties under the supervision of the government 
conducting response activities, such as soil removal or remediation, unless those activities 
were conducted negligently). 
90. See id. §§ 9601-9675; K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1148 
(W.D. Mo. 1998). 
91. Pre-acquisition soil testing is not an act of God or an act of war. 42 U.S.C. § 
9607(b)(l), (2). The third party defense is also not applicable because the release or 
threatened release of the hazardous substance must have been caused solely by "an act or 
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The Third Circuit, however, diverged from the accepted principles 
of interpreting CERCLA - that liability is strict and PRPs can only 
assert defenses in the statute's text - and created a new defense to 
liability. The Third Circuit reasoned that because the innocent 
landowner defense requires an appropriate inquiry into possible 
contamination at sites, Congress must have contemplated that pre­
acquisition soil investigations would occur, thus the investigations 
should not create liability under the statute.92 It reasoned that unless 
pre-acquisition soil testing was immune from CERCLA liability, 
prospective purchasers would be caught in a double bind if they 
dispersed hazardous waste during testing - if they bought the 
property, the innocent landowner defense would not apply because 
they would know of a previous disposal; if they did not buy the 
property, the defense would not apply because they would not be the 
owner of the site.93 The court then concluded that "[i]n order to give 
the defense effect, then, an 'appropriate' soil investigation cannot 
constitute disposal. "94 
Even if the Third Circuit is correct that the double bind would 
leave the innocent landowner defense without effect, the statute 
cannot support the construction given to it in CDMG Realty. The 
innocent landowner defense is "'a limited affirmative defense based 
on the complete absence of causation.'"95 Far from suggesting that 
omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant . . . .  " Id. § 
9607(b). Even a generous reading of the defense, requiring that the contractual relationship 
be connected to the hazardous waste at issue before a defendant would be precluded from 
invoking it, would still exclude soil testing activities from its coverage - the entire purpose 
of the contract between prospective purchasers and soil testers is to determine whether the 
site is contaminated by hazardous waste. See Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'I Fuel Gas 
Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that for the contractual relationship 
between the defendant and the person who was the sole cause of the release or threatened 
release to bar the application of the third party defense, the contractual relationship "must 
either relate to the hazardous substances or allow the [defendant] to exert some element of 
control over the third party's activities."). 
92. United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 721 (3d Cir. 1996). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 66 F.3d 
669, 682 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 
1988)) (emphasis added). Such a narrow interpretation of the defense is also most consistent 
with the legislative history of the Act. See, e.g. , 131 CONG. REC. 01471 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 
1985) (statement of Rep. Frank) ('This amendment says that wholly innocent landowners 
will not be held liable. We have had problems before with the [re)Ieases being granted 
improvidently. This amendment, I must say, is drafted in a way to make that extremely 
unlikely. To get a release from liability under this section, a landowner must not have 
himself or herself allowed or permitted any storage, not have contributed to the release of 
any substance and, and this is very important, the landowner has the burden of proof to 
show that this landowner had neither actual nor constructive knowledge at the time of 
purchase that the property had been used for hazardous waste materials. In other words, you 
can get a release under this only if you can show by the preponderance of the evidence that 
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efforts to establish the innocent landowner defense are immune from 
liability under CERCLA, the defense itself states that it does not 
apply to PRPs that contributed in any way to a release of hazardous 
waste.96 If testing spreads contamination at a site as described in Part I, 
both the testing company and prospective purchaser contributed to 
the release of a hazardous substance and the innocent landowner 
defense cannot apply by its own terms.97 CDMG Realty never 
addressed this explicit statement by Congress in the innocent 
landowner defense itself,98 possibly because the language precludes the 
court's interpretation of the statute. 
Furthermore, CDMG Realty's double bind argument is faulty for 
two reasons. First, although the name "innocent landowner defense" 
might suggest that it protects all landowners with pure motivations, in 
fact it only applies to a narrow subset of PRPs - those unfortunate 
enough to have no reason to know their property was contaminated 
when they purchased it.99 Thus, prospective purchasers that test and 
discover contamination could never take advantage of the innocent 
landowner defense even under the Third Circuit's altered liability 
scheme because they would know that the site was contaminated.100 
Second, although imposing liability for soil testing makes trying to 
establish the innocent landowner defense more risky, it does not 
eliminate the defense. The innocent landowner defense is still 
available if an appropriate soil investigation does not reveal, or 
spread, any contamination even though contamination was actually 
present.10 1 In fact, such persons - those who do not discover 
contamination after an appropriate inquiry although contamination is 
present - are the only ones who can take advantage of the defense 
because the defense is limited to those who had no reason to know of 
the contamination. Also, soil testing is not required in all situations, 
such as when the use history of the land does not indicate the presence 
you not only did not contribute to it; you did not even know when you bought it that it had 
this there."). 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(0). CERCLA states in pertinent part: 
Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this chapter of a defendant who, by 
any act or omission, caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance which is the subject of the action relating to the facility. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
97. See K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1151-52 (W.D. Mo. 
1998). 
98. See 96 F.3d 706. 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). See 131 CONG. REC. D1471 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) 
(statement of Rep. Frank). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). 
101. K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
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of contaminants.102 Interpreting the innocent landowner defense to 
apply only when the landowner truly has no reason to know of the 
contamination after an appropriate investigation of the property best 
suits the characterization of the defense as " 'a limited affirmative 
defense based on the complete absence of causation.' "103 
In sum, the arguments for a special exemption to CERCLA 
liability are contradicted by the current text of the statute. Thus, 
testing activity can create liability under CERCLA when it spreads 
contamination104 and there is no defense available for such activity.105 
However, allowing responsible testing may encourage the reuse of 
brownfields or at least reduce the risk of investigating contamination 
at old commercial sites.106 Therefore, Part III argues for a legislative 
solution compatible with Congress's recently articulated vision for 
CERCLA. 
III. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
This Part argues that a limited exemption from liability for soil 
testing will allow Congress to strike the appropriate balance between 
its original goals for CERCLA and its more recent efforts to ensure 
102 Id. See ASTM, Standard Guide for Environmental Site Assessments: Phase II 
Environmental Site Assessment Process, E1903-97. See also, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 291 F.Supp. 2d 105, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting the availability 
of the innocent landowner defense when contamination migrated onto the site from a 
neighboring parcel); United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 318, 
334 (D.R.I. 2002) (holding that it was an issue of fact whether the defendant had to conduct 
an environmental assessment when the site had been used as a junkyard). 
103. Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com'n, 66 F.3d 
669, 682 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 
1988)) (emphasis added). Such a narrow interpretation of the defense is also consistent with 
the legislative history of the Act. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. Dl471 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) 
(statement of Rep. Frank) (quoted in fn. 95). The innocent landowner defense was amended 
in 2002 by the Brownfields Revitalization Act, supra note 20, at § 223. The amendments, 
however, merely define in more detail what facts are necessary to establish the innocent 
landowner defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (2002). The Brownfields Revitalization Act also 
added the bona fide prospective purchaser liability limitation, which encourages soil testing 
much like the innocent landowner defense. In fact, the steps necessary to conduct an 
appropriate inquiry for the innocent landowner defense will also satisfy the appropriate 
inquiries prong of the bona fide prospective purchaser limitation. Id. § 9601( 40)(B). The new 
bona fide prospective purchaser liability limitation undermines rather than bolsters the 
Third Circuit's arguments, however. The limitation explicitly states that otherwise 
potentially liable persons cannot take advantage of it, Id. § 9601(40)(H); it reiterates that the 
liability limitation only applies to purchasers "whose potential liability . . .  is based solely on 
the purchaser's being considered to be an owner or operator of a facility." Id. § 9607(r)(l). 
Thus, like the innocent landowner defense, Congress made clear that the bona fide 
prospective purchaser limitation only protects those that contributed nothing to the 
contamination. 
104. See supra Part I. 
105. See supra Section II.A. 
106. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. 
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that fear of CERCLA liability does not prevent developers from 
purchasing brownfields. Specifically, this Part argues that Congress 
should amend CERCLA to exempt testing from the definition of 
disposal if the testing is done for the purpose of conducting 
"all appropriate inquiries" and is not inconsistent with accepted 
industry practices. 
Although both CERCLA and the SARA amendments107 were 
enacted quickly as compromise measures without much legislative 
history, courts recognize two overarching goals of the statutes: to 
guarantee that enough money is available to clean up hazardous waste 
sites, and to ensure that those who contributed to the contamination 
pay for cleaning it up.108 In order to deal effectively with the massive 
problems presented by hazardous waste sites, Congress felt it was 
important to ensure that "everyone who is potentially responsible for 
hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the 
costs of cleanup."109 Although holding pre-acquisition soil testers 
liable will advance Congress's original cash-flow and responsibility 
goals - more PRPs means more funds to help pay for site cleanup110 
107. See supra note 14 for information regarding the SARA amendments. 
108. These goals are a logical response to the Love Canal crisis, which prompted the 
enactment of CERCLA. See supra note 11. Love Canal and other residential areas 
contaminated with hazardous waste were a problem because the pre-CERCLA legal 
structure did not ensure that there would be sufficient funds for cleanups, nor that the 
polluters would be forced to pay the costs. See LIPELES, supra note 8, at 275-76. The Senate 
report lays out the basic elements of the CERCLA scheme this way: 
To achieve these goals five basic elements are included in legislation to broadly address the 
problems. These are: 
First, assuring that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury from 
chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions; 
Second, providing a fund to finance response action where a liable party does not clean up, 
cannot be found, or cannot pay the costs of cleanup and compensation; 
Third, basing the fund primarily on contributions from those who have been generically 
associated with such problems in the past and who today profit from products and services 
associated with such substances; 
Fourth, providing ample Federal response authority to help clean up hazardous chemical 
disasters; and 
Fifth, providing adequate compensation to those who have suffered economic, health, or 
other damages. 
S. REP. No. 96-848, at 6119 (1980) (quoted in part with approval in United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1998)). 
109. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56 n.l (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 
21 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
110. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342-
43 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Tanglewood East Homeowners v. 
Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) to reason that disposal should be defined 
broadly to encompass more potentially responsible parties, consistent with CERCLA's 
remedial goals). 
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and testing may contribute, albeit in a relatively small way, to the 
contamination at a particular site 1 1 1  - exempting them from liability is 
more consistent with Congress's refined goals for CERCLA. 
The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization 
Act 1 12 reflects a more nuanced view of hazardous waste liability. The 
preamble to the Brownfields Revitalization Act states that Congress 
was acting "to promote the cleanup and reuse of brownfields [and] 
provide financial assistance for brownfields revitalization."m The 
Brownfields Revitalization Act provides federal funding for the 
revitalization of brownfields 1 14 and encourages their reuse through the 
bona fide prospective purchaser limitation. 1 15 Thus, CERCLA now not 
only ensures that funds are available for cleanup, but it also 
encourages the redevelopment of brownfields. Allowing private 
parties to conduct responsible soil investigations without fear of 
creating additional liability will enable prospective purchasers to learn 
if, or how badly, a site is contaminated and therefore encourage the 
redevelopment of brownfields. 1 16 Even though prospective purchasers 
would still be unlikely to purchase badly contaminated sites because 
current owners are liable under CERCLA 1 17 unless they qualify as 
bona fide prospective purchasers, 1 18 it would be less risky for them to 
find uncontaminated or lightly contaminated brownfields to redevelop 
if Congress exempted soil testers from liability. 1 19 
In order for Congress to further the goal of brownfields 
redevelopment identified in the Brownfields Revitalization Act, 120 a 
soil testing liability exemption should have two elements. First, it 
should apply to all soil investigations conducted to establish that a 
person made "all appropriate inquires" because this statutory 
standard would encourage soil testing. 12 1 Second, to ensure that only 
1 1 1. See supra note 9. 
1 12. Brownfields Revitalization Act, supra note 20. 
113. Brown fields Revitalization Act, supra note 20. 
1 14. 42 u.s.c. § 9604(k) (2002). 
1 15. Id. § 9607(r). 
1 16. See GELTMAN, supra note 6, at 3. 
1 17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
1 18. Id. § 9601(40). 
1 19. Although there are an estimated 500,000 brownfield sites nationwide, no one 
knows if, or how badly, those sites are contaminated. See GELTMAN, supra note 6, at 5-7; see 
also MANUFACTURED SITES: RETHINKING THE POST-INDUSTRIAL LANDSCAPE 4 (Niall 
Kirkwood ed., 2001) (quoting the EPA's definition of brownfields as "abandoned or 
underused industrial and commercial sites where redevelopment is complicated by real or 
perceived contamination" (emphasis added)) . 
120. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
121. See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 721 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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responsibly conducted testing is exempt from liability, the legislative 
exemption should not include soil testing that is inconsistent with 
accepted industry practices. A standard based on why and how the 
testing was conducted'22 is superior to an exemption based on how 
much waste was disturbed'23 because it eliminates the need for experts 
to speculate about how much hazardous waste was moved by 
particular testing activities.124 Furthermore, it would be difficult to 
predict in advance how much hazardous waste a particular testing 
technique would move at a particular site,125 but testing companies 
could avoid conducting testing activities that are inconsistent with 
accepted industry practices. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note demonstrates that CERCLA, as it is currently 
formulated, leaves courts no choice but to impose the statute's strict, 
joint, and several liability scheme on pre-acquisition soil testers and 
those who hire them when that testing spreads contamination. Despite 
122. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) currently states that "[t]he term[] 'disposal' . . .  shall have the 
meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6903]." The 
Solid Waste Disposal Act defines disposal as 
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or 
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or 
any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged 
into any waters, including ground waters. 
Id. § 6903(3). 
One alternative for Congress would be to add the following language after the definition 
of disposal: except that any soil testing activity conducted as part of an "all appropriate 
inquiries" investigation shall not result in a disposal provided that the soil testing activity 
is not inconsistent with either i) the accepted practices in the environmental inspection 
industry or ii) the regulations promulgated by the EPA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(35)(B)(ii) for "all appropriate inquiries," or, if the EPA had not yet promulgated 
such standards and practices at the time of the soil testing activity, the applicable interim 
standards and practices described in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(iv). 
123. CERCLA's de micrornis exemption is an example of such a provision. Id. 
§ 9607(0). 
124. See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 720 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing 
the detailed evidence submitted on the question of whether the soil testing caused the 
disposal of any hazardous waste). It should be noted that the proposed statutory language, 
see supra note 122, would not exempt the testing activity described in CDMG Realty from 
the definition of disposal. The testing company in that case was performing structural testing 
to determine if the site, a landfill, could support construction. Id. at 722. It is unlikely that 
such structural testing would be done to establish that a party conducted "all appropriate 
inquiries." See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). This Note, however, primarily addresses the liability 
for pre-acquisition soil testing because that liability discourages the redevelopment of 
brownfields. Congress could, of course, exempt other activities from CERCLA's liability 
scheme. 
125. See CDMG Realty Co. , 96 F.3d at 720 (describing the uncertainty around whether 
testing holes that caved in resulted in the mixing of any contaminants). 
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this conclusion, courts have not consistently applied CERCLA to pre­
acquisition soil testing. The conflicting precedent addressing this 
question leaves testers and prospective purchasers exposed to 
uncertain liability. This uncertainty only creates additional risk for 
brownfield investors, who then have added incentives to 
forgo valuable brownfield investment opportunities, leaving industrial 
areas depressed. 
This Note concludes that a relatively simple solution to this 
problem is for Congress to act to clarify the liability of testers. The 
most promising policy solution would be to exempt from liability 
testing activities completed to establish that a party conducted "all 
appropriate inquiries" and that are not inconsistent with accepted 
industry practices. The exemption would promote responsible testing 
and facilitate the redevelopment of brownfields. 
